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Abstract 
This paper studies whether firms’ use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives 
are correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints 
and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to 
use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies. SMEs using legal 
methods to protect their intellectual property are more likely to use tax incentives. 
Results are ambiguous for large firms. For both having previous experience in 
R&D increases the likelihood of using tax incentives, while it reduces the 
likelihood of using exclusively subsidies, suggesting that the latter induce entry 
into R&D. Results imply that direct funding and tax credits do not have the same 
ability to address each source of R&D underinvestment, and that on average 
subsidies may be better suited than tax credits at least for SMEs. From a policy 
perspective these tools may be complements rather than substitutes.   
 
Keywords: R&D, tax incentives, subsidies, policy mix 
JEL classification: H25, L60, 038, O31 
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Barcelona for helpful comments.   
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1. Introduction 
Tax incentives and direct funding are two policy instruments used in many 
countries to stimulate private R&D activity. Both belong to a portfolio of tools 
that includes intellectual property rights (IPRs), public funding of basic research 
and public provision of venture capital. While IPRs and direct public funding of 
private R&D have a long tradition, tax incentives have spread gradually across 
countries, with some exceptions. Figure 1 shows OECD estimates of the relative 
weight of each instrument as a share of GDP in 2009 by country. Canada, The 
Netherlands and Japan rely mostly on tax incentives, while direct funding is still 
preferred in Sweden, Finland or Germany. Other countries use both instruments 
simultaneously: France, Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
The main economic rationale for using any of these tools rests mainly on the 
notion that market failures affect private R&D investment. Appropriability 
difficulties caused by knowledge spillovers, and external funding constraints 
derived from asymmetric information may lead to underinvestment by private 
firms, and ample empirical evidence supports both hypotheses. Which particular 
form public support should adopt to correct for these sources of market failure is, 
however, a matter of debate. Does each instrument address in practice both 
sources of market failures? Are there any conditions where one is to be preferred 
to the other? Is there an “optimal mix” of both instruments? While there is 
substantial empirical research estimating the effects that each instrument 
separately has on private R&D investment and outcomes, to the best of our 
knowledge the explicit comparative analysis embedded in the questions we raise 
remains virtually unexplored.1 
                                                          
1 The concern about the adequate policy mix is expressed in OECD's documents about innovation 
policy (see OECD 2010, chapter 4) and in the testimony by the OECD for the US Senate 
Committee on Finance, OECD (2011b). 
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This paper aims at providing evidence with respect to the first question by 
analysing the use of R&D tax credits and direct funding when both tools are 
available. We claim that if the two main factors causing market failures in R&D, 
limited appropriability and financing constraints, affect firms’ R&D investment 
decisions, they are likely to be perceived as hurdles for their potential innovation 
plans. If the policymakers aim at providing support to firms when they are 
affected by these hurdles, we should observe a positive correlation between 
indicators of these barriers as perceived by firms and the probability that a firm 
will claim an R&D tax credit or have direct support or both.   
 
Existing impact evaluation studies have focused so far on testing whether public 
support leads to additional private R&D investment. We contribute to this 
literature in two ways. First, we focus explicitly on the role that sources of market 
failures play in the programme participation stage. This may provide useful 
insights for interpreting results that are obtained in these studies. To illustrate this 
point, assume that from an impact estimation exercise with firm-level data we 
obtain that supported firms on average barely increase their private R&D 
investment, or that the share of sales of new products, a standard indicator of 
innovation outcomes, is not significantly different from a control group of non-
supported firms. Should the conclusion be that the policy is not effective? 
Possibly not if the subsidized firm applied for and obtained support precisely in 
anticipation of imitation, and does introduce an innovation that is quickly 
imitated. Second, we compare the use of subsidies and tax incentives by firms that 
can potentially use both and study whether the correlation between sources of 
market failures and use of each tool is similar for both. 
 
Tax incentives and direct support (subsidies and loans) have been simultaneously 
available in Spain at least since the early eighties, although a major legal change 
increasing tax incentives took place in 1995. We use firm-level data from two 
non-overlapping waves of the Spanish edition of the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS), 2003-2005 and 2006-2008, to study this question.  We find that 
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SMEs that face financial constraints are less likely to use R&D tax credits. 
Instead, they are more likely to use direct public funding exclusively. Regarding 
appropriability, SMEs that use legal methods to protect their intellectual property 
are more likely to use tax incentives or both instruments. For large firms we find a 
different pattern: financially constrained firms are less likely to use both tools, and 
more likely to have no support. For both types of firms, human capital and 
previous R&D experience are important determinants of the use of each tool; in 
particular, previous R&D experience increases the likelihood of using tax 
incentives, while firms without R&D experience are more likely to use subsidies, 
suggesting that the latter are able to induce new R&D investment (an effect on the 
extensive margin) while tax incentives are not.  In the case of SMEs, estimates are 
robust to changes in the definition of dependent variables and for most 
subsamples of firms. 
 
Our results suggest that direct funding and tax credits do not have the same ability 
to address the main sources of private R&D underinvestment, given the design of 
R&D tax incentives and of subsidy allocation in Spain. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that there are some key differences between both 
tools. To be able to claim tax credits firms must be able to finance projects with 
own or other private external resources first and later have positive taxable 
income, while subsidies provide up-front financing which is independent of the 
firm's tax position.2  Firms that face important appropriability difficulties may 
prefer subsidies as well, because their R&D effort may not generate much 
additional income if their innovation is quickly imitated, preventing them to 
benefit from tax incentives. On the other hand, firms that face small 
appropriability difficulties but are not financially constrained may find tax 
incentives more appealing than direct support. Provided that crowding out effects 
can be ruled out, some combination of both instruments could be preferable from 
                                                          
2 This obviously depends on the specific design of R&D tax incentives. While in Spain and France 
firms that invest in R&D can obtain a deduction from  their tax liability, which therefore has to be 
positive at some point (both systems contain carry-forward provisions), in the Netherlands firm's  
the R&D deduction is applied to wages paid to R&D staff, and is thus independent of the tax 
position. 
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a social point of view to relying on only one when both sources of 
underinvestment in R&D are at play.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we briefly review the 
literature most closely related to our research questions. In section 3 we describe 
some facts revealed by the data. In section 4 we lay out some hypotheses 
regarding the use of R&D tax credits and subsidies. In section 5 we describe and 
discuss the empirical analysis. Results are presented in section 6. Finally section 7 
contains concluding remarks.  
2.  Previous evidence   
Many firm level studies have found evidence that productivity responds both to a 
firm’s own investment in R&D as well as to others’ R&D, the latter being 
interpreted as a measure of R&D spillovers across firms (Hall, Mairesse and 
Mohnen, 2010).3There is also evidence that SMEs face an innovation financing 
gap, while the evidence is mixed for large firms (Hall and Lerner, 2010)). But 
even if the case for intervention seems to be well established, each policy 
instrument may have drawbacks. Direct public support through subsidies reduces 
the private costs of investing in R&D, but places high information requirements 
for the public agency awarding them and may allow for discretionary behavior. 
Tax credits and allowances may appear to be a neutral, simple and non-interfering 
tool, but the specific design is important, as they might be easily claimed for 
projects that yield high private returns and would have been carried out anyway. 
Empirical evidence evaluating the impact of both tools becomes therefore very 
valuable for policy design and improvement.  
 
Over the last two decades, a significant volume of empirical research to assess the 
impact of either direct support or of R&D tax credits on the level of private R&D 
                                                          
3 Further evidence on spillovers suggests that those associated to product innovations may be 
larger than those of process innovations, and larger for SMEs than for large firms (Ornaghi, 2006). 
Spillovers do not completely deter private investment in R&D, as own R&D may still generate 
sufficiently high returns if the firm can use some appropriability mechanism to control leakages, 
and enables the firm to benefit from others’ R&D by increasing its absorptive capacity.  
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investment has been produced. The main concern of most of this research has 
been testing for full crowding out effects, which if confirmed would imply that 
public resources are wasted.4 With only a few exceptions (Haegeland and Moen, 
2007, Berubé and Mohnen, 2009 and Marra, 2008), however, the effects of each 
tool have been independently studied.5 Ignoring that both mechanisms are 
simultaneously in place in some countries may lead to overestimated effects if 
firms use both.  
 
Most work on R&D tax incentives has been based on standard investment models, 
where tax incentives are a component of the user cost of capital. This modelling 
provides a framework for testing for crowding out effects, but is not designed to 
ask which types of firms are more likely to use tax incentives, and whether 
indicators of appropriability or of financial constraints play a part in it. Some 
researchers have used an alternative empirical approach, based on matching 
methods (Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros, 2008, Czarnitzki et al, 2011 and Duguet, 
2012). This method allows to control for the non-random nature of programme 
participation by estimating a participation equation. This step has allowed the 
authors to include an indicator of financial capacity to explain the likelihood of 
using R&D tax credits, finding a significant and positive relationship, suggesting 
that this particular policy instrument may not be able to address well one of the 
sources of underinvestment in R&D.  
 
Several modelling approaches have been used as well to assess the effects of 
public subsidies to business R&D. To control for the endogeneity of support, a 
                                                          
4 For evidence on tax credits, see Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002) and Lokshin and 
Mohnen (2011). On direct grants or loans, see González et al. (2005), Czarnitzki,  Ebersberger and 
Fier (2007) and Arqué and Mohnen (2012). 
5 Haegeland and Moen (2007) find that the additionality of tax credits is higher than the 
additionality of grants awarded through the Research Council and Innovation Norway, which 
would be consistent with the latter selecting projects with large externalities but low private return. 
Berubé and Mohnen (2009), use a sample of Canadian firms that benefited from tax credits, a 
subset of which received subsidies, and find that those receiving subsidies introduced more new 
products and made more world-first product innovations. Marra (2008) estimates an R&D 
investment equation and finds that both instruments increase private investment. The possible link 
between estimate programme participation and indicators of financing constraints or of spillovers 
is not investigated in these studies. 
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programme participation equation is estimated in some cases. Firm size, industry 
dummies, and other firm characteristics are typically included in the selection 
equation, but no link to indicators of sources of market failures has been fully and 
explicitly made.6 Possibly the work coming the closest to this idea is Gelabert, 
Fosfuri and Tribó (2009), who investigate whether the impact of direct support on 
private R&D depends on the degree of appropriability. They estimate a 
programme participation equation that includes indicators of appropriability as 
well as of financial constraints. Their appropriability indicator turns out not to be 
significant; the financial constraints indicator is significant but with a negative 
sign, contrary to expected. According to these results the outcome of the public 
agency’s subsidy allocation would not seem to be consistent, on average, with 
addressing market failures.7  
 
A recent contribution by Takalo et al. (2011) is the first to provide a theoretical 
model for the R&D subsidy allocation process (firm’s application and agency’s 
granting decisions) and private R&D investment. They use Finnish firm and 
project level data to estimate a structural model and find that technical challenge 
turns out to be the most significant and important variable in the agency`s subsidy 
rate decision. The rating, in turn, is found to be positively correlated with some 
firm characteristics: in particular, with the volume of sales per employee and with 
being an exporter. They assume away financing constraints. Since R&D tax 
incentives are not used in Finland, they cannot offer a comparative analysis of 
instruments. 8  
 
                                                          
6 Czarnitzki et al (2007) use an indicator of appropriability, but do not include indicators of 
funding constraints. Hussinger (2008) uses a credit rating index, and finds that firms with better 
rating are more likely to obtain direct public funding in Germany. 
7 Their sample consists of firms that invest in R&D at least once between 2000 and 2005. Possibly 
most are stable R&D performers. In addition, their sample is biased towards large firms: average 
size is about 450 employees. These are firms are less likely to face tight financing constraints. 
8 They model the subsidy programme as a game of incomplete information between a firm and the 
public agency, where the agency’s objective function includes spillover effects and the firm’s 
profits are a function of the expected subsidy rate, which in turn depends on the firm’s beliefs 
about the agency’s valuation of its project. Results are consistent with the agency being selective 
by choosing high quality projects that generate spillovers. Takalo et al. have access to project level 
data while we do not, their rating equation estimation provides useful insights for our empirical 
specification. 
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To sum up, to the best of our knowledge no study has analysed whether there is an 
association between the two potential sources of underinvestment in R&D and 
actual use of direct support and of tax incentives, explicitly comparing both 
instruments and including in the sample firms that are not stable R&D performers 
or do not invest in R&D but could potentially do it. We also look at the potential 
effect on the extensive margin of both policy tools. The different nature of these 
tools in some potentially relevant dimensions, and the different extent of public 
involvement associated to each, lead to anticipating heterogeneous effects both 
across tools and across firms.  
 
3. The Data: some facts.  
A sketch of the institutional setting is in order before describing the data. In Spain 
R&D tax incentives and direct support have been simultaneously available to 
firms at least since the early eighties, although a major legal change increasing tax 
incentives took place in 1995; some minor changes have followed since. Tax 
incentives are provided through deductions from corporate taxable income (100% 
of current R&D expenditures, and 100% write off of R&D fixed assets except 
buildings) and from the firm’s tax liability (the tax credit). The tax credit offered 
is a combination of incremental and volume based system. There is a (small) tax 
credit for innovation (non-R&D) expenditures as well. In 2006 to 2008, the total 
volume of tax credits was somewhat above 300 million € yearly, according to 
official records. The number of firms claiming tax credits was 3621 in 2006, 
falling to 3150 in 2008.  Direct support, mostly channelled through a public 
agency, the CDTI, provides grants and loans for firms’ R&D and innovation 
projects. The volume of support provided by CDTI in 2006 was 800 million € 
(1090M€ in 2007, and 766M€ in 2008), for about 1000 projects. Direct support is 
thus at least twice as large as the volume of tax credits, although it reaches a 
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smaller number of firms. 9 In appendix A we provide a more detailed account of 
both policy tools.   
   
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the PITEC, a firm-level panel data 
set developed by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE) as a by-product of the 
European Community Innovation Survey, which in Spain is conducted yearly.10 It 
collects information related to innovation activities of firms with more than 10 
employees in all manufacturing and service industries. Answering the survey is 
mandatory in Spain, and the response rate is high (about 90%).  
 
We use data from the surveys conducted from 2005 to 2008, and focus on 
manufacturing firms. It is important to note that some questions refer to a three 
year period (2003-2005; 2004-2006; and so on) and others to the survey year. 
Examples of the first type of information are geographical market of the firm, 
introduction of new products and/or processes, use of information sources, 
cooperation to innovate, barriers to innovation, use of public support to innovate 
and use of intellectual property protection mechanisms.  
 
In 2008 several questions relating to the use of tax credits were introduced in the 
survey. Firms were asked whether they took into account the potential tax credit 
they could claim for their R&D investments, whether they had claimed tax credits 
in 2008 and each of the previous four years.11 As for direct support, the 
questionnaire includes every year, since the launching of the survey, two 
questions on this issue. One asks strictly for the amount of R&D subsidy (non-
reimbursable funds) received that year from each different level of the public 
administration; the second asks whether the firm received any kind of public 
support (basically loans and subsidies, but the wording is ambiguous with respect 
                                                          
9 See Dirección General de Tributos and CDTI annual reports. 
10 PITEC is the abreviation for "Panel de Innovación Tecnológica en las Empresas". A description 
of the survey can be found at the following link (in Spanish):  http://www.ine.es/. The Community 
Innovation Survey has been widely used for innovation and policy evaluation studies; Mairesse 
and Mohnen (2010) discuss some its characteristics and shortcomings.  
11 The total number of firms that declare using tax incentives in 2008 in PITEC is 1742 
(manufacturing and services); our sample covers thus about 55% of all claimants that year. 
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to tax credits) in the years 2006-2008. We base our description and baseline 
estimation on the first question. 
 
We measure each type of support across the three year period: a firm is classified 
as having an R&D subsidy if it declares obtaining one at least one of the three 
years in the period, and similarly for tax incentives. The sample includes both 
R&D and non-R&D performers, as the latter are potential support users and we 
are interested in identifying the features both of firms that have and do not have 
support. We split the sample in two groups according to firm size.12 Table 1 
describes the use of R&D support by type, where subsidies include only grants. It 
shows that large firms benefit more from both tools, as only 36% do not have any 
form of support, while this figure is 47% for SMEs, and that SMEs benefit more, 
in proportion, from subsidies. The category of firms with no support may include 
some that perform R&D and did apply for a subsidy but were rejected, or that 
were unable to claim tax credits because of low taxable income, as well as firms 
that do not perform R&D.  
[Insert Table 1 ] 
 
A distinctive characteristic of the CIS survey is that it provides qualitative 
information on barriers to innovation as perceived by the firm, as well as on the 
importance of several sources of information for the firm's innovation process. 
This set of questions can generate indicators of potential sources of 
underinvestment in R&D. In particular, firms are asked to rank a series of 
potential barriers to innovate. The main barriers of interest are financing 
constraints, both internal and external, demand uncertainty and the extent to 
which the market is dominated by established firms. 
  
                                                          
12 SMEs that have received any form of public support for R&D or those that have reported R&D 
expenses in the current or past years are surveyed every year. The remaining firms come from a 
random sample stratified by size and sector among non-R&D performing firms. Innovators are 
over represented: over 50% of SMEs in the PITEC sample invest in R&D against 13% in the 
population, according to INE. In the case of large firms, the figures are 72% and 62% respectively.   
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Table 2 below shows the percentage of firms that considered each barrier to be of 
high importance in 2003-2005 by support status, as well as their use of legal 
intellectual property protection mechanisms. Support status appears to be 
correlated with financing constraints and use of protection, and, for SMEs, also 
with lack of personnel.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
 
Lack of internal and external finance, together with uncertain demand, are the 
barriers most often perceived as important. SMEs are more sensitive to these 
barriers than large firms. They are more sensitive as well as to other barriers such 
as access to information on markets or technology. The simple correlation among 
the first three barriers is high (about 0.7), while it decreases across the remaining 
barriers. We have checked whether firms change their perceptions of barriers 
between the 2005 and 2008 surveys, and find that about half of the firms keep the 
same perception. Almost all that change their answer do so only moderately (they 
may change from level of importance  "high" to level "medium", but very few 
change from level "high" to "not relevant").    
 
Quite surprisingly, the survey does not include any direct question related to the 
firm’s concern for imitation by rivals, which would provide an indicator of 
expected appropriability difficulties. The current version of the Spanish CIS asks 
firms about the actual use by the firm of legal protection mechanisms. We assume 
that use of these mechanisms signals that a firm believes that threat of imitation is 
important and that using legal protection may prevent it at least to some extent. 
 
It is interesting to note that not all firms that were investing in R&D in 2005 (in-
house R&D) claimed tax credits in subsequent years: 65% of SMEs and 41% of 
large firms. Many firms, mostly SMEs, declare that the main reason for not 
claiming is that their R&D expenditure is too low; some large firms declare that 
their type of R&D does not fit eligible expenditures.  
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Other variables may be associated to support status. Firms are heterogeneous in 
potential innovative capacity; R&D fixed and sunk costs, and expected benefits 
from R&D. These features may affect their ability to both claim tax credits and to 
apply and obtain subsidies. Table 3 shows the median level of some proxies for 
these factors (2005 values) by support status in the period 2006-8. Some patterns 
emerge: firms that benefit from tax credits, alone or combined with subsidies, 
have slightly higher human capital than those without support or with only 
subsidies; there is also a higher proportion of firms with previous R&D 
experience among firms that claim tax credits than among firms with only 
subsidies. Relative productivity is also higher for firms that benefit from tax 
credits, either alone or combined with subsidies. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
 
This description suggests that there may be a correlation between the type of 
support used and firms’ perception of financing constraints, although mildly so in 
the case of large firms, as well as an association with the use of protection 
mechanisms and past R&D experience. In the next section we provide some 
arguments as to why these patterns may be expected.   
 
4. Direct and indirect R&D support: some differences and hypotheses. 
The purpose of this section is to discuss some hypotheses about the potential 
relationship between the barriers firms face to perform R&D and the use of each 
instrument. We do not develop a formal model of firm’s R&D investment strategy 
and participation decisions, but conduct an informal discussion that leads to some 
conjectures about that relationship.13  
 
We start by pointing out that some differences in the design and timing of R&D 
subsidies and tax incentives may determine who is more likely to benefit from 
                                                          
13 While there is theoretical work comparing patents, prizes and subsidies (Fu et al 2012), to the 
best of our knowledge tax incentives have not been included in these comparisons.  
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each. Direct public funding (subsidies and subsidized loans) is obtained only if the 
firm submits an application to the public agency and this agency decides 
favourably after screening the proposals. The requirements explicitly and publicly 
set by subsidy awarding agencies are often related to the innovative content of the 
proposal, the technical ability of the firm to carry it out, and the potential 
market.14 The agency may rate projects along several dimensions, such as 
potential for generating additional social value, i.e., spillovers, or for generating 
radical innovations through collaboration with public research labs or with 
universities. It may as well take into account whether firms face financing 
constraints, although these items are not always necessarily made public.  
 
Grant awards are thus based on the merit of the projects according to the agency’s 
assessment. If the agency has good quality information and is able to anticipate 
either the potential for spillovers or the financing constraints faced by the firm, it 
can tailor the magnitude and duration of direct support to the particular features of 
the project, although a maximum subsidy rate is often set in practice. The firm 
runs the project once funding has been approved and usually the agency provides 
a down payment to start the project.15 It should be noted that application is not 
costless, as preparing a good proposal requires at least time and qualified labour. 
Funded projects reflect both a firm’s decision to apply and agency preferences. 
 
R&D tax incentives, on the other hand, do not require the approval of a specific 
project by a government agency. Provided as tax credits –a reduction from the tax 
liability- or as tax allowances –a deduction from taxable income-, they are 
targeted to all potential R&D performers, irrespective of the quality of the project. 
                                                          
14  There may be important differences across countries in the specific design of direct support. In 
the United States, the description of SBIR programme, which targets SMEs (see 
http://www.sbir.gov) states that R&D risk and fixed costs are key motivations for the programme. 
Public agencies involved with the programme set R&D topics in solicitations. In Finland, the 
public agency Tekes values the degree of novelty and research intensity of projects but does not 
appear to set specific topics (http://www.tekes.fi). The Spanish case is similar to the Finnish. See 
Huergo and Trenado (2010) for a detailed description of the Spanish case. The European Union 
Framework Programmes require proposals to have European level added value and usually 
transnational cooperation. 
15 Once the firm has had a project proposal approved, it may be able to obtain additional funding 
from the private sector. Agency approval may act as a quality certification.  
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There may be volume-based credits or incremental credits, or a combination of 
both; upper limits on the amount of tax credit may be set. A firm may claim a tax 
credit on any expense that qualifies as a research and development expenditure 
according to the tax code; the only requirement is for the firm to follow proper 
accounting rules for this type of expenses. To be able to benefit from a tax credit 
the firm must have a positive tax liability, unless a refund system is established.16 
The cost of claiming tax credits can be expected in principle to be lower than the 
cost of applying for subsidies, since a firm must file for taxes every year anyway.  
 
When tax credits are applied to the corporate tax, they may be looked at as an ex-
post  prize for successful innovation outcomes, while when they are applied to the 
corporate wage and social contribution tax, they act as a prize for R&D effort 
(searching for ideas, which may be unsuccessful), regardless of the outcome. This 
difference may be important for firms' decisions, because in the first case the 
ability to claim the prize depends on the firm’s tax position, but not in the second 
case. We will focus here exclusively on the possible differences between subsidies 
and tax credits applied to the corporate tax liability because this matches better the 
legal environment that firms in our sample face.  
 
From this description, several potentially relevant differences between subsidies 
and tax credits can be noted in three respects: i) eligibility/requirements; ii) 
magnitude and certainty of support; iii) timing of support. 
 
Eligibility/requirements: while any R&D project may qualify for a tax credit, a 
partially different set will qualify for a subsidy. All privately profitable projects 
qualify for a tax credit. Some of these, but not all, may qualify for a subsidy as 
well, provided that they satisfy the agency’s requirements: quality level, extent of 
radical (rather than purely incremental) R&D, generation of additional social 
value, even if they generate sufficient private returns. But subsidies may in 
                                                          
16 In some countries other than Spain the design of R&D tax incentives may allow firms to get a 
direct refund of their tax credit if the firm has no tax liability, so this requirement would not apply 
(see France and UK, for young innovating firms, or Canada, for all firms domestically owned).   
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addition encourage projects that would not be privately profitable otherwise, 
therefore unable to generate profits and hence a positive or significant deduction.  
 
Magnitude of support: although both tax incentives and subsidies imply a cost 
reduction, subsidies provide more certainty on the extent of this reduction for the 
firm. If awarded, the firm knows the amount of support it will get, whereas in the 
case of tax incentives the effective support depends on the firm’s tax position, 
which may be difficult to predict especially for SMEs. In addition, subsidies may 
be tailored to the nature of the difficulties associated to the project, i.e., whether 
these are spillovers (with grants), or financing constraints (with loans), or both. 
 
Timing of support: subsidies usually provide upfront funding for R&D projects, 
while tax incentives do so after the project has been privately funded.  In the case 
of tax credits, independently of whether they are applied to the corporate tax or to 
wage or social security contribution taxes for R&D employees, the firm must be 
able to fund the project in advance. While large firms are less likely to suffer from 
financial constraints, new firms and SMEs may be less able to start an R&D 
project because of lack of both internal and external funding, and therefore unable 
to benefit from this instrument.17 In addition, R&D subsidies not only provide up-
front funding for R&D, but also may provide a signal of the quality of a project to 
potential private investors. Tax incentives cannot perform this role. Again, this 
feature may be of special relevance to new firms and SMEs. 
 
Another important issue in R&D decision-making are fixed and sunk costs, which 
may become an entry barrier for some firms. Previous empirical work with 
Spanish firms provides evidence (González et al 2005, Máñez et al. (2009) and 
Arqué and Mohnen (2012)). Arqué and Mohnen analyse the role of subsidies as a 
tool to induce R&D investment by previously non-R&D performers (the extensive 
margin) in addition to the usual intensive margin effect, and find that indeed about 
25% of Spanish manufacturing firms need subsidies to start, but not to continue, 
                                                          
17 Recent evidence suggests that constrained firms are less likely to start innovative projects 
(Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2008).  
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R&D activities. Finally, Aw et al (2011) study the relationship between R&D and 
exporting in a dynamic setting allowing for sunk costs to both activities, implying 
that the firm's past exports and R&D should affect current decisions. They find 
significant evidence consistent with the presence of sunk costs in both. Whether 
tax incentives can also play this role is an open question which we can investigate. 
 
We claim that when firms’ potential R&D projects differ across some or all the 
features that generate underinvestment: risk of imitation (appropriability), 
financing constraints and sunk costs, these differences will affect firms’ decisions 
as to which instrument to use, given the differences just described. Our first 
conjecture is that when a firm’s potential R&D projects suffer from significant 
appropriability difficulties, it will prefer to apply for a subsidy because the agency 
can set a sufficient subsidy level to compensate the firm for the lower expected 
private return. When expected spillovers are large the project may generate very 
little taxable income, so potential tax deductions may be too low to compensate 
for profit erosion. For low spillover levels, or if the firm is diversified so that it 
obtains sizable taxable income from other products, then tax credits may be more 
attractive than subsidies, as the expected subsidy might then be low and below the 
cost of applying.  
 
Our second conjecture concerns the relationship between financing constraints 
and type of support. In the corporate taxation literature, Keuschnigg and Ribi 
(2010) predict that R&D tax credits will not only encourage innovation but also 
relax financing constraints and help innovative firms to exploit investment 
opportunities to a larger extent. We believe, however, that in absence of 
spillovers, SMEs and young firms that are financially constrained are more likely 
to prefer and obtain subsidies. Subsidies provide upfront funding to start a project, 
and in addition may enable firms to obtain additional private funding as a result of 
a certification effect, unlike tax credits (Takalo and Tanayama, 2010).18  For large 
                                                          
18 Takalo and Tanayama develop a a theoretical model of the allocation of direct R&D subsidies in 
a context of financial constraints derived from asymmetric information. There are three types of 
agents: financially constrained entrepreneurs whose projects may be of low or of high quality, 
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firms, however, the expected tax credit may be more predictable and large, and 
may help them mitigate milder financing constraints. Finally, our third conjecture 
is that the presence of sunk costs would also make subsidies more appealing to 
potential entrants into R&D.  
 
To sum up, this discussion suggests that tax credits and direct support may not 
have the same ability to deal with both sources of market failures: when these are 
significant, subsidies would be better suited to address them, especially for SMEs 
and young firms. When they are mild, tax credits may do it, especially for large 
firms. We should therefore observe a positive correlation between financial 
constraints and use of subsidies, and a negative correlation between financial 
constraints and use of tax credits. Regarding appropriability, we would observe 
high appropriability to be positively correlated with the use tax credits, and low 
appropriability positively correlated with use of subsidies. If indicators of 
financing constraints and of appropriability difficulties are available, these 
predicted patterns could be tested.  
 
To test these predictions we will use a two equation discrete model (a bivariate 
probit model). Indicators of financial constraints, appropriability and past R&D 
investment will be the key independent variables. We will take into account as 
well other factors that may affect a firm’s support status, which include those that 
shape the incentives to innovate and perform R&D. These are, among others, 
competitive pressure, distance to the productivity frontier, and innovative 
capacity. As in most existing research in this area, we take a reduced form 
approach as an approximation to a complex decision process, since we do not 
have information to model the agency’s awarding decisions.   
 
                                                                                                                                                               
private investors and a public agency. The public agency’s role is mainly to identify high quality 
entrepreneurs, such that by granting a subsidy it provides a signal to private investors in addition 
to the subsidy itself, enabling the firm to obtain private external funding. The model predicts that 
firms with high quality entrepreneurs will always apply for funding, while firms with low quality 
projects will apply with some probability.  
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5 Empirical Analysis 
5.1  Variables 
We use two non-overlapping waves of the CIS survey. Our dependent variables 
are obtained from PITEC 2008, where questions refer either to the period 2006-
2008 or to year 2008. In order to be able to deal at least partially with potential 
endogeneity issues, we use most explanatory variables from PITEC 2005, where 
questions refer to the period 2003-2005 or to 2005. We describe next the core 
variables we use; Table 1B in Appendix B provides descriptive statistics.  
 
Dependent variables 
We define two binary dependent variables: Tax Incentives and Subsidies. For Tax 
Incentives, the binary variable equals 1 if the firm declares having claimed tax 
credits any year within the period 2006-2008. We believe that since tax credits are 
subject to carry-forward provisions, using a three year period instead of a single 
year may provide a more accurate description of firm behavior. We later test for 
the sensitivity of results to changes in the definition of the dependent variables, 
and use annual observations instead.  
 
Subsidies. We define a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm has obtained 
direct funding (only subsidies are included in this definition, loans and public 
contracts are excluded) from the Central Administration any year within the 
period 2006-2008, which obviously implies that the firm has applied for support. 
Note that the survey does not provide information about whether a firm applied 
for but did not obtain direct support. The observed status captures then not only 
the firm's decision to apply but also the public agency's preferences. The awarded 
funds may spread over more than one year, as funded projects may run from 1 to 
3 or 4 years, so using a three year period may again be appropriate. Although 
firms may obtain direct support from local, central or European administrations, 
we consider that since R&D tax incentives are a policy implemented by the 
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Central government, they should be compared to the direct support policy from 
the same government level.19  
 
Core Independent variables 
 
Financing constraints. Cash flow has been frequently used as a proxy for 
financing constraints in R&D investment equations. As this measure has been 
subject to criticism, some researchers have recently turned to using direct 
measures of financing constraints which are derived from direct questions in 
surveys (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2010; Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2011, 
Peters and Hottenrott, 2011). 20  
 
Direct measures of financing constraints may have some advantages relative to 
cash flow or similar measures, but they may in turn suffer from other 
shortcomings. Previous studies that use CIS data have obtained counterintuitive 
results with respect to the correlation between barriers and innovative activities. In 
a study by the OECD (2009), reporting the results of a multi-country firm-level 
estimation of a variant of the Crepon-Duguet-Mairesse model of R&D and 
productivity, the estimates show a positive association between most barriers and 
the probability of engaging in innovation activities for most countries.21 A 
possible explanation that has been offered is that innovative firms become more 
aware of the difficulties associated to innovating than non-innovative firms. This 
interpretation suggests that self-assessment of barriers may be endogenous to 
innovative behavior, particularly because in these studies both sets of variables 
refer to the same time period. An additional problem is that there may be 
                                                          
19Regional or local governments do not provide R &D tax incentives. There is however one 
particular case, the Basque country, where the cap on the tax credit does not apply. Regarding 
direct support, eligibility criteria for support may differ both across government levels and across 
regional agencies (Blanes and Busom, 2004), so aggregation might distort results. Overall, the 
volume of regional government support is small.   
20 Hajivassiliou and Savignac use a French firm-level data set that includes direct, subjective direct 
indicators of financing constraints similar to ours as well as objective but indirect indicators such 
as leverage ratio, cash flow or the profit margin. They find that they are highly correlated. When 
accounting for the possible simultaneity between contemporaneous financing constraints and the 
probability of engaging in innovation activities, they find that financing constraints have a 
negative effect, as expected.  
21 The same type of firm-level data source and methodology were used for each country and the 
data were fundamentally a cross-section.. 
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individual-specific heterogeneity in subjective evaluations of constraints: some 
respondents may tend to be optimistic, while others pessimistic. We address these 
concerns by i) using lagged indicators of barriers, ii) dropping from the sample 
firms that declare that there is no need to innovate as the main reason for not 
doing so, and iii) measuring the relative importance of each barrier with respect to 
the average importance of all barriers for that firm.22. We expect this lagged 
variable to control both for the subjective overall individual-specific perception of 
difficulties and for endogeneity, to some extent. As described above, firms report 
the degree of importance of lack of access to internal and to external financing as 
a barrier to innovation. Because of the observed high correlation between both 
barriers, we define a single measure for both. In our sensitivity analysis, we will 
redefine this as binary variable which equals 1 if the firm considers that either 
barrier is of high importance.  [Financially constrained] 
 
Appropriability. In most existing empirical work the standard indicator of 
appropriability has been the use of legal protection mechanisms. We also take this 
approach and define a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
used any of them (copyrights, trademarks, design or patent) in the period 2003-
2005 [Appropriability]. As this variable might capture as well past innovation 
experience, we will include past in-house R&D. In addition, the inclusion of past 
R&D serves as an indicator of whether the firm faces R&D entry sunk costs.  
[Did-in-house R&D] 
 
New firm. Young or newly created firms may face specific difficulties to pursue 
R&D projects, since they are likely to lack internal funds, reputation and credit 
history. Private external funds will be hard to get in these conditions. In addition 
the public agency may offer particular support to new technology based firms. 
                                                          
22 An alternative way we explore to deal with these issues is to include an additional control 
variable that aims at capturing the firm's overall perception of difficulties. It is computed as 
follows: we add the rankings given by the firm to each barrier, and rescale so that it takes values in 
a 0 to 1 range. It captures the firm’s “Awareness of constraints”: larger values indicate that a firm 
perceives a high overall level of barriers. We later check for the robustness of estimates to 
alternative ways to control for these potential biases. 
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Since the survey records whether the firm is new, we define a binary variable to 
represent a new firm in 2003-2005. [New firm] 
 
Other variables and controls. 
The survey provides information relative to other barriers to innovation as 
perceived by the firm, described in Table 2. We include the following, each 
calculated as the ratio between the rating given by the firm to that particular 
barrier and the sum of ratings of all barriers declared by the firm. Dominant Firm: 
The existence of an established dominant firm may have disincentive effects on 
other firms (Cabral and Polak, 2007). Demand risk: Uncertain demand for 
innovative goods or services may be an important barrier for firms, especially for 
SMEs or firms that produce a single product. Other barriers included in the 
empirical specification are Lack of personnel and Lack of information.  
 
Some firm characteristics affect their ability to generate innovations and to benefit 
from them.. Human capital is an undisputable driver of the ability of a firm to 
generate ideas and high quality R&D projects and to use external knowledge. 
Both macro and firm level studies provide evidence in this respect (Leiponen 
2005). A firm’s human capital has several dimensions, including manager’s 
abilities, human resource management practices, and employee skills. As a crude 
measure of human capital we use the proportion of employees with a higher 
education degree, defining several intervals to account for possible non-linearities. 
These intervals are: no high degree employees, positive but less than the median, 
between the median and the 90th percentile, and higher [Low educated, Medium-
Low, Medium and High Educated]. In addition, each firm was asked whether 
existing tax incentives were taken into account when planning its potential R&D 
investment. We believe that the answer may capture the managers' standpoint on 
the strategic importance of R&D for their firm. Lacking other indicators of 
managerial characteristics that might be relevant for innovation decisions, we 
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include this binary indicator as a control variable [Take into account tax 
incentives].23 
 
Technological Rivalry: The importance that the firm gives to information from 
competitors as a source of ideas for innovation is usually interpreted as an 
indicator of incoming spillovers (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). We believe it 
may also capture at the same time the extent of technological and product market 
rivalry in the firm's industry as perceived by the firm. We would expect firms in 
this kind of neck-and-neck competition to be more likely to apply for and use all 
types of public support. 24 
 
Incentives to innovate may be affected by the firm's position relative to the 
technological frontier (Aghion et al., 2009). In addition, returns to innovation may 
be higher for more productive firms (Aw, Roberts and Xu, 2011). We will 
consequently include a measure of productivity distance of the firm relative to the 
mean of its sector of activity. Manufacturing is classified into 30 subsectors, and 
for each we compute the average labour productivity as sales per employee. We 
then divide each firm's labour productivity in 2005 by the average of its subsector 
[log of Relative productivity] 
 
Finally, the following binary variables are added to control for other sources of 
heterogeneity: belonging to a group [Group membership], being a private 
domestic firm [Private domestic firm], being an exporter [Exporter], whether or 
not the firm invested in physical capital in 2005 as a proxy for demand 
expectations [Fixed investment], location near a science or technological park 
[Located in technological park], regional location and industry dummies 
capturing technological intensity [high, medium high, medium low and low]. Firm 
                                                          
23 Note that taking into account tax credit incentives does not predetermine claiming them. 
Although most firms that do not take them into account do not claim tax credits, 56% of SMEs and 
60% of large firms that do take them into account do not claim them. The Pearson correlation 
between the two variables is .28 for SMEs and .30 for large firms.   
24 This information is not available for all firms in the sample, but only for innovators. 
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size is accounted for by a set of binary variables for each of a series of size 
intervals, according to the number of employees.  
 
5.2 Econometric Model 
Our two dependent variables, use of tax incentives and use of subsidies, are 
binary. We specify and estimate a bivariate probit for several reasons: i) it allows 
for correlation between the random terms across alternatives, and ii) it possibly 
captures more accurately outcomes of the decision processes of the firm and the 
agencies: tax filing periods may not be the same as grant application and granting 
periods; in addition, firms may not be able to anticipate their tax position when 
applying for direct funding. A Multinomial logit model with four alternatives 
would not be appropriate, as the IIA assumption is likely to be violated.  
 
We drop from the sample those firms that declare not having an interest in 
innovating, as we want to focus on the role of barriers for firms that do have a 
potential interest for innovating, thus distinguishing between behavior resulting 
from preferences from behavior resulting from perceived restrictions. We keep in 
the sample firms that do not do R&D because these are potentially innovative 
firms that may have applied for support but not obtained it, or find that expected 
support is too low, given the innovation barriers they face.  
 
We would expect to find the following patterns in the data: i) a negative 
correlation between financing constraints and the likelihood of claiming tax 
credits, particularly for SMEs and young firms; ii) a positive correlation between 
financing constraints and the likelihood of applying for and obtaining direct 
support; iii) a positive correlation between appropriability difficulties and direct 
support; iv) the correlation between appropriability difficulties and use of tax 
credits may depend on the magnitude of spillovers (possibly positive for small 
spillovers), and v) a positive correlation between previous R&D experience and 
use of tax incentives.  
 
24 
 
 
These patterns should be most clearly distinguishable in the cases where firms use 
only tax credits and where they use only grants. Some firms will use both tools at 
the same time (see Table 1 above): these firms may have more than one R&D 
project, one being subsidized because of spillovers while the others generate 
taxable income; or may have obtained a subsidy because they face financing 
constraints but not appropriability difficulties. We do not have information at the 
project level to disentangle this. On the other hand, we expect not using any 
support to be related mostly to low innovative capacity: firms that have a low 
level of human capital, or perform basically imitative innovations. However, firms 
that are moderately innovative (their R&D is mostly of an incremental nature and 
thus does not qualify for a subsidy) may also be in this category if they have little 
taxable income. 
 
The model consists of a direct support equation (S), which can be viewed as a 
reduced form of the application and granting process, and a tax incentive equation 
(T): 25 
(1) S = 1 if  S*= bsX+es > c,  
 S = 0 otherwise   
(2) T = 1 if  T*= btX + et > h  
 T = 0 otherwise  
 
where es and et are jointly distributed as a bivariate normal BN(0, 1, ρ), S and T 
are the observed binary variables for use of direct support and tax credits in the 
period 2006-2008, and X are predetermined  explanatory variables.  
 
There are be four possible situations a firm can be in: no support (0,0); uses only 
tax credits (0,1); uses only  a direct subsidy (1,0) and  gets both a grant and claims 
a tax credit (1,1), and therefore four sets of corresponding joint probabilities.  
Several types of marginal effects may be computed; we report below the average 
                                                          
25 Note that we do not have information on R&D direct support application: firms are not asked 
whether they applied for but did not obtain public grants or loans. 
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marginal effect, which is the average of the marginal effects evaluated at each 
value of x.  
 
6 Results 
6.1  Baseline estimation 
We perform separate estimations for SMEs and for large firms.  Table 4 (SMEs) 
and Table 5 (Large firms) report the estimated average marginal effect of a change 
in explanatory variables on the joint probability of each of the four possible 
situations a firm may be in. We perform several tests. We test for equality of 
coefficients across equations (1) and (2), for the four core variables: financing 
constraints, appropriability, past R&D and new firm. The null is rejected for the 
first three variables in the case of SMEs, and rejected for the last two in the case 
of large firms.26 As a specification test, we perform a test for normality of 
residuals, and do not reject the null for both samples. We also test for endogeneity 
of financing constraints, using the Blundell-Smith test; we do not reject the null. 27 
Finally, we obtain a low but positive and significant correlation between the 
residuals of both equations, suggesting that some unobserved variables affect the 
use of both instruments in the same direction (rho=0.08 for SMEs and rho=0.12 
for large firms).   
 
Next we discuss the estimated average marginal effects we have obtained for the 
probability of using only tax credits and of using only direct support, as we expect 
the results of these two cases to offer a sharper picture of the differences between 
both tools. For SMEs, we find that being financially constrained reduces the 
probability of using only tax credits by about 4 percentage points, while it 
increases the probability of obtaining direct support also by about 4 percentage 
points. These results are consistent with the expected patterns. Regarding 
appropriability, as captured by the use of legal protection mechanisms, we find 
                                                          
26 Chi-square tests not reported in the tables but available on request. 
27 For the normality test, see Chiburis (2010).  We perform the endogeneity test separately for 
subsidies and for tax incentives. Firm's age is used as instrument for financing barriers. 
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that SMEs that have protected IP in the preceding period are more likely to use 
tax incentives, either as a single tool or in combination with subsidies. Since we 
control for past R&D investment, we believe that this result suggests that firms 
that protect their innovations are more likely to generate profits and are therefore 
in a better position to claim tax credits.28 Access to grants, instead, is independent 
of appropriability status. With respect to previous in-house R&D experience, we 
find again opposite patterns across firms that use only one or the other tool: 
previous experience is positively correlated with using tax incentives only, and 
negatively correlated with using grants only. This suggests that subsidies can 
induce firms to invest in R&D, while tax incentives alone are quite less likely to 
do so. We can infer that the agency awarding direct support cares about increasing 
the number of R&D performers, rather than only focusing on increasing the R&D 
intensity of stable performers. This result is in line with Arqué and Mohnen 
(2012). Tax incentives instead are more likely to benefit stable R&D performers. 
The subsidy policy and the tax incentive policy may be complementary in that 
respect. A formal test of complementarity as in Mohnen and Roller (2005) is 
however beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
We find other interesting differences in the impact of other variables on these 
probabilities. A high level of human capital increases the likelihood of using only 
direct support, suggesting that firms with high quality projects are more likely to 
use grants. A firm's relative productivity is positively correlated to the probability 
of using tax incentives only, but negatively with the probability of receiving 
subsidies. Firms in the smallest size intervals (less than 20 employees and 
between 20 and 50) are less likely to use tax incentives, while they do not show 
any disadvantage relative to larger firms in the use of subsidies. Finally, we find 
different patterns across industries. Firms in high-tech and medium-high 
technological intensity are more likely to use tax incentives only. It is remarkable 
                                                          
28 Although applying for direct support entails revealing project information to the public agency, 
the agency does not disclose this information to the general public. If the firm obtains direct 
support its R&D costs fall even if imitation by rivals is immediate, whereas it might be unable to 
use tax credits if innovation barely generates profits.  
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that none of the other innovation barriers appears to be on average correlated with 
the use of public support. 
 
We now look at the other two groups of firms: those that do not use any support, 
and those that use both tax credits and direct support. We find that having 
previous experience in R&D is one of the most important determinants of using 
both kinds of support, jointly with managerial awareness of R&D incentives. 
Having a high proportion of highly educated employees increases the likelihood 
of using both types of support; since this variable is not correlated with using only 
tax incentives, this result corroborates that at least for SMEs the public agency 
succeeds in selecting high quality R&D projects. The likelihood of not using any 
support is higher for firms without human capital, without previous R&D 
experience, low productivity and for non-exporters. These results are in line with 
Aw et al. (2011) and Takalo et al (2012). Smaller firms are also more likely to be 
in that group.  
 
Results differ somewhat for large firms. We do not find a significant correlation 
between financing constraints or appropriability and the likelihood of using tax 
incentives only or subsidies only. Financing constraints are inversely related to the 
probability of using simultaneously both instruments, and directly related to using 
none. We also find that the most distinctive difference between firms that use only 
tax incentives and firms that use only subsidies are the role of human capital and 
previous R&D experience. Firms that do not have human capital are less likely to 
use tax incentives (the probability falls by 0.14 pp), while they are more likely to 
obtain subsidies (the probability increases by 0.11 pp). Subsidies appear in this 
case to be used to increase the innovative capabilities of some firms, a role that 
tax incentives do not perform. An finally, firms that have previous R&D 
experience are more likely to use tax incentives only or both forms of support, 
while firms without previous R&D experience are more likely to obtain direct 
subsidies, in line with the result obtained for SMEs. 
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Overall, our results suggest that direct support may be more effective to 
encourage firms that face financial constraints to invest, or invest more, in R&D, 
while tax incentives may encourage increasing R&D by firms that are not 
financially constrained and already invest in R&D. Direct support and tax 
incentives would therefore not be substitutes, as the latter would not be well suited 
to financially constrained firms. Tax incentives may provide some compensation 
to firms affected by low appropriability difficulties, particularly for SMEs. For 
large firms the indicators of market failures appear to be unrelated to the use of 
both policy tools. Instead, previous R&D experience and the firm's level of human 
capital do seem to play a role in the use of each instrument, with grants being able 
to induce non-R&D performers to invest in R&D, and to increase the innovation 
capability of firms with very low levels of human capital.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
We also estimate the model including as a proxy for technological rivalry the 
importance to the firm of information from competitors.29 Because only firms that 
were innovators in 2005 answer this question, the samples are somewhat smaller 
(about 300 SMEs less and 100 large firms less than in the estimation above). We 
find that SMEs that consider that information from competitors is highly 
important are more likely to use subsidies only, and less likely to use tax 
incentives only. For large firms, the likelihood of using both increases when 
competitors' information is important, while the likelihood of not using any falls. 
These results are consistent with neck-and-neck competition. As technological 
rivalry pushes SMEs to use subsidies only rather than tax incentives only, we may 
infer that what leads these firms to apply for and obtain direct support is that their 
R&D projects are likely to benefit rivals through imitation.  
 
                                                          
29 Results not reported but are available on request. 
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6.2 Robustness analysis. 
In this section we explore the robustness of our results to (a) differences in the 
firms’ innovativeness status, (b) changes in the definition of barriers to 
innovation, and (c) alternative definitions of the dependent variables.  
 
We begin by re-estimating the baseline model for different subsamples of firms. 
We first estimate the model for the subset of firms that introduced products new to 
the market in 2005 or before, because this particular subset may be more sensitive 
to appropriability issues; second, we re-estimate for the subset of firms that were 
doing R&D in 2005, and finally we estimate the model for the subset of firms in 
high tech and medium tech manufacturing sectors.  
 
Second, we change the way we calculate financing and other constraints. Instead 
of computing the relative importance of each particular constraint for the firm, we 
generate a binary variable for each barrier which equals 1 when the barrier is of 
high importance to the firm, and include an index of the level of overall barriers.  
 
Third, we change the definition of dependent variables, a firm’s use of tax credits 
and of direct support. Instead of using variables referring to the 2006-8 period, we 
use binary dependent variables referring to year 2008 only. We also reestimate the 
model using the second, more ambiguous question in the survey on public 
support. 
 
Table 6 reports estimated average marginal effects for the main independent 
variables of interest, financing constraints and appropriability. 30 The main 
estimates of interest remain quite stable for SMEs: financing constraints are 
always negatively correlated to the use of tax incentives only, and they increase 
the likelihood of using direct support only. As for appropriability, firms that have 
used legal protection methods are more likely to use tax incentives, alone or in 
combination with subsidies. For the subsample of large firms some results change 
somewhat with respect to financing constraints. They become non significant for 
                                                          
30 Remaining variables are included as in the baseline. Detailed results are available on request. 
30 
 
 
all four possible situations when we change the definition of dependent variables 
or of financing constraints. Appropriability does not seem to be correlated with 
support status, as in the baseline.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
We now compare our results for using only direct support to those obtained by 
Gelabert et al. (2009), who used the same data base, keeping in mind that there are 
some differences with respect to the samples used as well as with respect to the 
empirical model. First, they use data for the years 2000 and 2002 to 2005, keep an 
unbalanced panel of firms that reported positive internal R&D expenditure at least 
one of these years in all sectors, including services, and average firm size is large. 
Second, they do not perform separate estimations for large firms and SMEs. 
Third, they estimate a univariate probit model, because they do not take into 
account the use of tax incentives. Otherwise, the definitions of appropriability and 
financing constraints are very close to ours. Our results partially differ from 
theirs: while they found that firms facing financial constraints are less likely to 
obtain public support, we find that the opposite effect for SMEs. With respect to 
appropriability, our results are basically in line with theirs.  
 
 
6.3 Some further results: change of support status 
 
While we do not have enough data to perform a dynamic analysis, we can 
complement our study by testing whether appropriability, financing constraints 
and previous R&D experience are related to the change in support status across 
the two periods, that is, the transition probabilities. Table 7 below reports the 
proportion of firms by support status in 2005 and their status in 2006-8. It shows 
that 40% of those SMEs that were not using any support in 2005 did obtain some 
during the next period (a similar percentage in the case of large firms). Most often 
they obtained a subsidy. There is a higher stability in support status among large 
firms than among SMEs, as 76% of large firms that used both types of support in 
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2005 kept having it during the following years. Among SMEs, however, 40% of 
those that had obtained a subsidy in 2005 did not use any support in the following 
period.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
We are particularly interested in testing whether our core variables are related to 
the change of support status of firms that did not enjoy any in 2005. We can use a 
Multinomial logit model for that purpose, using as dependent variable support 
status in 2006-8, which has four possible values: 0 (no support), 1 (only subsidy), 
2 (only tax incentives) and 3 (both). The probability of transition of a firm i from 
the state 0 (no support) to the state j`next period is given by: 
 
Prob(Sit=j' |Sit-1=0) = (exp(xit-1β))/(∑jexp(xit-1β) 
 
where i=1,...N, and j'=0,1,2,3. We estimate these probabilities only for SMEs, as 
the number of large firms in each cell is too small, and with the two possible ways 
to compute financing constraints. We find that the probability of switching from 
no support to using only subsidies increases for firms with high human capital (8 
pp); this is in fact the only significant variable. The probability of switching from 
no support to using only tax incentives increases if the firm has invested in R&D 
in 2005 (by 5pp), has used some form of intellectual property protection and its 
relative productivity is high. It falls if the firm has a small size. These results are 
in line with previous results. The role of financing constraints remains ambiguous, 
since for one of the measures it is negative and significant, but not significant for 
the second. Finally, the probability of switching to using both sources of support 
increases with human capital, productivity and firm size. New firms are also 
found more likely to switch to this status.  
 
On the whole, our results suggest that although some firms use both tools, tax 
incentives and subsidies are used to a great extent by different types of firms. Tax 
incentives tend to be used by medium and large firms, firms that already invest in 
R&D, have high productivity and are able to protect their innovations, and firms 
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from knowledge intensive industries. We find that financing constraints do not 
increase, but rather decrease, the likelihood of using this tool. Subsidies, instead, 
are more likely to be used by firms with high human capital that may or may not 
invested in R&D previously, and that are likely to be financially constrained. 
R&D subsidies would hence be better suited to address market failures associated 
to genuine innovation and to induce new entrants into R&D. We think that by 
jointly estimating the use of direct support and of tax credits, and by 
discriminating by firm size, we have been able to characterize better the use of 
both tools and their association to financing constraints and appropriability. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Our analysis has addressed the use by firms of two tools of public support to 
private R&D activities, direct support and tax incentives, assessing the link with 
potential barriers to innovation, with a special emphasis on the role of financial 
constraints, appropriability indicators and past R&D experience. To the best of 
our knowledge this is the first time that both policy instruments are compared 
from this perspective. Using data from a sample of two waves of the Spanish CIS 
survey, 2003-2005 and 2006-2008, we have estimated the determinants of the 
likelihood of using both tools at once, in isolation or none, separately for SMEs 
and large firms.  
 
Our results do suggest that for SMEs there is an association between the source of 
market failures related to R&D and the use by firms of these two tools of public 
support to R&D, an issue that has not been previously studied in the literature. 
Financing constraints affect differently the likelihood that a firm will use each 
instrument. In particular, the probability of using tax incentives falls when firms 
face financing constraints, while the likelihood of using direct funding increases. 
There are differences as well regarding the effect of appropriability, as measured 
by the use of legal forms of protection. For large firms our findings are 
inconclusive. In both cases, however, tax incentives are more likely to be used by 
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firms with past R&D experience, while subsidies may induce non-R&D doers to 
invest.  
 
The main implication of these results is that tax incentives may not be a good 
instrument to address private R&D underinvestment when financing constraints, 
lack of appropriability and sunk costs are the main source of the problem, while 
direct support may be more appropriate. In that respect, our results are consistent 
with Berubé and Mohnen (2009), who found that among Canadian firms claiming 
tax credits those receiving subsidies are more likely to introduce products new to 
the world, and with Cappelen et al. (2012), who conclude that R&D tax credits in 
Norway result in the development of new production processes (possibly 
associated with low spillovers) rather than in new products for the market or in 
patents. Nevertheless, tax incentives may be useful in addressing small 
apropriability problems of firms that are not financially constrained, but more 
research is needed in this respect, distinguishing between large firms and SMEs. 
 
On the whole, our evidence supports the hypothesis that tax incentives and direct 
funding are not substitutes from a policy perspective. The use of multiple policy 
instruments to address private underinvestment in R&D may be optimal in a 
second-best world with multiple market failures, informational and political and 
administrative capacity constraints. These issues have been considered in the 
design and implementation of environmental policies (Bennear and Stavins, 
2007), and may be relevant for innovation policy as well. Solid evidence on the 
actual allocation and effects of each policy instrument should be further developed 
to guide instrument choice and design.  
 
We think this paper contributes a step in that direction, even though we are aware 
of its limitations. In particular, one limitation of our work is that the available data 
does not allow us to take into account possible dynamic effects across and within 
instruments. Another limitation is that the Community Innovation Survey does not 
provide direct indicators of the threat of imitation as a barrier for innovation.  
Some project level information could be helpful in that regard, as well as adding 
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some direct questions. Two further issues that are not addressed satisfactorily in 
the CIS survey are information on the degree of competition/ rivalry, and 
indicators of managerial practices and abilities.31 As the design and administration 
of innovation surveys is spreading to the US and other non-European countries, 
reviewing the questions in light of the results of empirical work, might be not too 
costly and have a significant pay-off for enabling policy impact analysis.  
 
                                                          
31 For an example of a survey on management practices that has been designed to quantify them 
and to test their association to productivity and other variables, see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).    
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Figure 1. Direct funding and Tax Incentives for Business R&D 2009 
 
(in % of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Direct funding includes grants, credits and public procurement. Indirect 
funding refers to forgone tax revenue from all tax incentives related to R&D: tax 
credits and allowances, social security contributions, reductions in R&D labour 
taxes. Sub-national tax incentives are not included. China, Greece, Iceland, Israel, 
Italy, the Russian Federation and the Slovak Republic provide R&D tax incentives 
as well as direct support but cost estimates are not available and are thus excluded 
from this graph; data on direct support in these countries is available in the source. 
Source: Adapted from OCDE (2011a), OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Scoreboard 2011 
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Table 1: Public Support to private R&D in 2006-2008 
 
 SMEs Large firms 
 N % N % 
Firms with no public support  1848 47 341 36 
Firms with only subsides  923 23 162 17 
Firms with only tax credits 679 17 241 26 
Firm with both types of support 462 12 189 20 
Total number of firms 3912 100 933 100 
Notes: Subsidies here includes only grants. The total number of firms shown is the maximum 
number of observations in the sample. Sample size will be smaller in estimations because of 
missing values for some observations. We have discarded firms that do not intend to innovate 
because they declare that innovating is not necessary. 
 
 
Table 2: Barriers in 2005 and Support Status in 2008 
 
 SMEs Large firms 
 No 
support 
Use only 
Subsidies 
Use 
only tax 
credits 
Use 
both 
No 
support 
Use only 
Subsidies 
Use 
only tax 
credits 
Use 
both 
Financing 
Constraints 41% 43% 32% 36% 24% 27% 23% 25% 
Demand risk 21% 21% 19% 21% 12% 12% 15% 14% 
Dominant 
firms 21% 19% 19% 24% 14% 21% 16% 14% 
Lack of 
information 14% 14% 11% 14% 5% 9% 11% 9% 
Lack of 
personnel 14% 14% 12% 12% 6% 8% 6% 8% 
Protect 
innovations 31% 33% 45% 44% 29% 40% 41% 51% 
Notes:  
Financing barriers includes both internal and external sources; lack of information includes both 
market and technological information. N=3685 SMEs and N=835 Large firms (the number of 
firms in estimations may be slightly smaller due to missing data). 
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Table 3: Firm size, human capital and productivity by support status. 
Median value 
 
 SMEs Large 
 No 
support 
Use only 
Subsidies 
Use 
only 
tax 
credits 
Use 
both 
No 
support 
Use only 
Subsidies 
Use 
only 
tax 
credits 
Use 
both 
Firm size  
Number of 
employees         
34 32 46 48 319 375 380 341 
% Employees 
with higher 
education        
12% 12% 15% 18% 7% 9% 10% 12% 
Relative 
Productivity  0.68 0.68 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.99 1.06 1.07 
Did R&D in 
2005  (%)          70% 73% 90% 91% 51% 65% 90% 89% 
Notes: All variables except support status refer to 2005. Support refers to the years 2006-2008, 
while firm characteristics refer to 2005. Relative Productivity is computed as the firm's 
sales/employee over the industry mean           
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Table 4. SMEs. Bivariate Probit Regression 
Average Marginal Effect (AME) on the probability of using... 
 
 Only tax incentives Only subsidies No public support Both types of 
support 
Variable AME AME AME AME 
Financially 
constrained 
-.038*** 
(.012) 
.039*** 
(.014) 
.004 
(.017) 
-.006 
(.009) 
Dominant firm -.003 
(.009) 
-.000 
(.011) 
.007 
(.014) 
-.004 
(.007) 
Demand risk .008 
(.010) 
.005 
(.012) 
-.029** 
(.014) 
.016** 
(.007) 
Appropriability .029*** 
(.010) 
-.014 
(.012) 
-.035** 
(.015) 
.020*** 
(.008) 
Log of Relative 
productivity 
.029*** 
(.004) 
-.026*** 
(.008) 
-.038*** 
(.010) 
.023*** 
(0.005) 
Low educated 
employees 
-.057*** 
(.021) 
.024 
(.022) 
.078*** 
(.028) 
-.044*** 
(.015) 
High educated 
employees 
.017 
(.017) 
.042** 
(.020) 
-.122*** 
(.024) 
.064*** 
(.012) 
Capital investment .039*** 
(.013) 
-.010 
(.015) 
-.066*** 
(.019) 
.037*** 
(.010) 
Take into account 
tax incentives 
.123*** 
(.009) 
-.056*** 
(.012) 
-.159*** 
(.014) 
.092*** 
(.008) 
Group membership .018 
(.013) 
-.017 
(.016) 
-.004 
(.019) 
.004 
(.010) 
Private domestic 
firm 
.047** 
(.020) 
-.027 
(.025) 
-.495* 
(.029) 
.029* 
(.015) 
Exporter .042*** 
(.012) 
-.029** 
(.014) 
-.035** 
(.017) 
.022** 
(.009) 
Did in-house R&D .093*** 
(.013) 
-.044*** 
(.016) 
-.117*** 
(.019) 
.067*** 
(.010) 
Size 1 -.074*** 
(.017) 
.030 
(.021) 
.102*** 
(.025) 
-.058*** 
(.013) 
Size 2 -.033** 
(.015) 
.006 
(.019) 
.068*** 
(.023) 
-.037*** 
(.012) 
Size 3 -.034** 
(.015) 
.009 
(.019) 
.056** 
(.023) 
-.031*** 
(.012) 
New firm -.042 
(.034) 
.051 
(.040) 
-.009 
(.048) 
.001 
(.025) 
Located in 
technological park 
.067** 
(.031) 
-.031 
(.038) 
-.087* 
(.048) 
.050** 
(.025) 
N observations 654 832 1691 446 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; Total number 
of observations: 3623; Wald chi2(48)=691.69; Log Pseudolikelihood= -4131.3142; rho= 0.08 
(s.e.=0.03). Regional and industry binary variables have been included. The omitted firm size 
category is 100-199 employees. 
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Table 5. Large Firms. Bivariate Probit Regression 
Average Marginal Effect (AME) on the probability of using... 
 
 Only tax incentives Only subsidies No public support Both types of 
support 
Variable AME AME AME AME 
Financially 
constrained 
-.044 
(.032) 
.020 
(.027) 
.079* 
(.043) 
-.056* 
(.033) 
Dominant firm -.027 
(.022) 
.019 
(.019) 
.018 
(.027) 
-.010 
(.021) 
Demand risk -.002 
(.027) 
-.007 
(.023) 
.040 
(.028) 
-.031 
(.022) 
Appropriability -.028 
(.026) 
.032 
(.023) 
-.036 
(.028) 
.032 
(.022) 
Log of Relative 
productivity 
.012 
(.019) 
.006 
(.016) 
-.073*** 
(.022) 
.055*** 
(.017) 
Low educated 
employees 
-.143*** 
(.047) 
.108*** 
(.039) 
.067 
(.055) 
-.032 
(.042) 
High educated 
employees 
.056 
(.046) 
-.038 
(.040) 
-.049 
(.051) 
.030 
(.040) 
Capital investment .037 
(.043) 
-.033 
(.038) 
.008 
(.052) 
-.011 
(.040) 
Take into account 
tax incentives 
.146*** 
(.023) 
-.095*** 
(.021) 
-.137*** 
(.026) 
.086*** 
(.021) 
Group membership .030 
(.030) 
-.024 
(.026) 
-.010 
(.033) 
.005 
(.026) 
Private domestic 
firm 
.019 
(.028) 
.003 
(.024) 
-.086*** 
(.031) 
.065*** 
(.024) 
Exporter .007 
(.035) 
.010 
(.030) 
-.070* 
(.040) 
.054* 
(.031) 
Did in-house R&D .131*** 
(.029) 
-.059** 
(.025) 
-.244*** 
(.034) 
.171*** 
(.029) 
Size 1 -.006 
(.040) 
-.016 
(.034) 
.095** 
(.045) 
-.073** 
(.034) 
Size 2 .055 
(.045) 
-.060 
(.039) 
.056 
(.048) 
-.051 
(.037) 
Size 3 .001 
(.056) 
-.013 
(.049) 
.055 
(.060) 
-.043 
(0.47) 
New firm -.148*** 
(0.43) 
.152*** 
(.074) 
-.111 
(.303) 
.107 
(.232) 
Located in 
technological park 
-.117 
(.085) 
.109 
(.074) 
-.036 
(.085) 
.045 
(.066) 
N observations 203 143 300 160 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; standard errors 
in parentheses. Total number of observations=806; Wald chi2(48)=254.12; Log Pseudolikelihood=-
942.91536; rho=0.12 (s.e.=0.06). Regional and industry binary variables have been included. 
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Table 6. Robustness Analysis 
Average Marginal Effects of financing constraints and appropriability 
by support statusa 
 
Panel A: SMEs Financially constrained Appropriability 
Type of support: None TC S TC+S None TC S TC+S
         
Baseline  -.04 .04  -.04 .03  .02 
         
Dep var as in Baseline,  
Subsample of firms that introduced  
products new to the market in 2003-2005
 -.04 .04      
Dep. var. as in Baseline, 
Subsample of firms that did R&D in 2005  -.04 .04   .03   
Dep. var. as in Baseline 
Subsample of firms in high and medium-
high tech industries 
 -.04   -.06   .03 
Dep. var. as in Baseline 
Change in computation of financing 
constraints 
.04 -.05 .03 -.02 -.03 .03  .02 
Change in Dependent Variables: 
 Subsidy and TI in 2008, whole sample  -.04 .02  -.06 .03 .01 .02 
Change in Dependent Variables: 
Subsidies+Loans and TI 2006-8b  -.05 .02  -.05 .02  .02 
 
   
Panel B: Large Firms Financially constrained Appropriability 
 None TC S TC+S None TC S TC+S
         
Baseline .08   -.06     
Dep. Var. as in Baseline  
Subsample of firms that did R&D in 2005 -.11   -.10     
         
Dep. Var. as in Baseline 
Change in computation of financing 
constraints 
        
Dep. Var. as in Baseline 
Subsample of firms in high and med-high 
tech industries 
.10       .07 
Change in dependent variables:  
Subsidy and TI in 2008, whole sample         
Change in Dependent Variables: 
Subsidies and Loans, and TI 2006-8  -.08 .06  -.05 -.05 .04 .05 
Notes: (a) Only significant estimates are reported; blank cells indicate a non-significant estimate has 
been obtained. For large firms estimations for some subsamples could not be performed because the 
number of observations in some of the categories was too small (less than 45 firms). 
(b) The estimated correlation between errors of both equations is higher for both samples (rho=0.30 
(se =0.03) for SMEs, and rho=0.36 (s.e.=0.06) for large firms). This possibly reflects the fact that 
the question is phrased in such a way that there is some ambiguity as to whether to include tax 
incentives as public support.  
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Table 7: Changes of support status 
Support 
Status 
2005 
Support Status 2008, SMEs Support Status 2008, Large firms 
None S TC S+TC Total N firms None S TC S+TC Total N firms 
             
None 60.2 28.3 6.9 4.6 100 2631 62.3 25.3 8.1 4.2 100  454 
S 39.7 38.0 8,2 14.1 100 184 21.6 54.9 9.8 13.7 100  51 
TC 4.5 1.9 59.5 34.1 100 694 2.5 0.0 61.0 36.6 100  240 
S+TC 1.7 3.5 38.6 56.1 100 114 0.0 0.0 24.6 75.4 100  61 
Note: None=No Subsidy, No Tax Credit; S = Subsidy, No Tax Credit; TC= No Subsidy, Tax 
Credit; S+TC= Subsidy and Tax Credit. 
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APPENDIX A 
Main features of R&D tax incentives and direct support in Spain. 
Tax Incentives 
R&D Tax incentives for R&D investment have been in place in Spain since 1995, when a new law on 
corporate taxation was introduced. The definition of R&D eligible expenses follows the OECD Frascati 
Manual guidelines. In 1999 (Act 55/99) some non-RD technological innovation expenditures were included 
as eligible for tax credit at a 10% or 15%  rate, depending on the type of expenditure. Tax credit rates were 
initially 20% of R&D volume, and 40% of the excess on average R&D expenditures of the two preceding 
years, with a cap of 35% of the tax liability. In 2001 (Act 24(01)r both rates were increased (to 30% and 50% 
respectively), as well as the cap (to 50% for SMEs if the credit was greater than 10% of the tax liability., In 
2004, in addition, 20% of the labour cost of employees assigned  exclusively to R&D tasks could be 
deducted. Rates were somewhat reduced in 2007 and 2008. From 2007 onwards, firms could use the 
alternative option of deducting from the social security tax 40% of the liability corresponding to R&D 
employees. Excess credit can be carried forward up to 15 years.  Firms that obtain R&D and innovation 
subsidies can claim tax credits on all R&D expenditure remaining after substracting 65% of the subsidies 
received. For further information see 
  http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-
ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Impuestos/Direccion%20General%20de%20Tributos/Paginas/Direccion%20general
%20de%20tributos.aspx  
 
Direct support to R&D and innovation through CDTI. 
The annual reports of the main funding agency, CDTI, provide the following information about direct support 
during the period studied in this paper. In 2006, CDTI contributed 802 Million € to 1032 projects (out of 1434 
applications). Most of the funding (50%) was allocated to technological development projects; 14%  to 
technological innovation projects (mostly adoption of innovations); 9% to cooperative industrial research,  
25% to large public-private research consortia (CENIT projects, launched in 2005; first call in 2006). The 
first three types were offered 0-interest loans and up to a 20% grant, depending on the features of the project. 
CENIT projects were offered grants of up to 50% of the R&D budget; these are 4 year-long projects, with 
budgets between 20 to 40 Million€.  Loans were offered to new technology based firms of up to 70% of the 
budget of the project, with maximum funding of 400 thousand € (Neotec Projects). In 2007, CDTI 
contributed 1090 Million € to 1111 projects. The budget across project types changes somewhat over time. In 
2008, projects i) and ii) were combined in a single category so as to comply with EU state aid rules. Total 
CDTI funding decreased to 766 Million€ that were allocated to 1124 projects. 67% of funding was allocated 
to projects in the new merged category. The grant rate was increased to 25%. CDTI provides advice on tax 
incentives to firms that obtain direct support. It issues at no cost for the firm a certificate of the project as 
being either an “R&D project” or a “Technological Innovation project”. This certificate enables the firm to 
directly claim tax credits and is binding for the tax authority. 
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APPENDIX B: Sample Descriptive Statistics by Support and Size 
SMEs 
No support 
N=1691 
 
Only subsidies 
N=832 
 
Only tax credits 
N=654 
 
Subsidies  
and tax credits 
N=446 
 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Awareness of constraints .50 .23 .51 .23 .50 .20 .51 .21 
Financially constrained .40 .49 .43 .50 .31 .46 .35 .48 
Lack of personnel .14 .35 .14 .35 .12 .32 .12 .32 
Lack of information .14 .35 14 .34 .12 .32 .13 .34 
Dominant firm .21 .41 .20 .40 .20 .40 .24 .43 
Demand risk .21 .41 .20 .40 .19 .39 .22 .41 
Appropriability .31 .46 .33 .47 .44 .50 .46 .50 
Log of Relative productivity* -.43 .75 -.48 .98 -.15 .63 -.19 .66 
Fixed Investment  .76 .43 .78 .41 .88 .33 .89 .32 
Low educated employees* .15 .35 .13 .33 .03 .18 .03 .17 
High educated employees* .07 .25 .11 .32 .12 .32 .18 .38 
Take into account tax incentives .31 .46 .33 .47 .62 .49 .64 .48 
Group membership* .20 .40 .19 .39 .30 .46 .32 .47 
Private domestic firm* .93 .25 .93 .25 .92 .27 .92 .27 
Exporter* .67 .47 .65 .48 .82 .38 .83 .38 
Did in-house R&D*  .70 .46 .73 .44 .90 .30 .91 .28 
Log of number of employees* 3.51 .93 3.47 .97 3.82 .89 3.85 .91 
New firm* .02 .14 .03 .18 .02 .12 .02 .15 
Age* 22.3 17.4 21.7 17.7 24.5 17.8 24.8 18.6 
Located in technological park .01 .12 .02 .14 .04 .18 .05 .22 
Region: Madrid .08 .27 .08 .28 .06 .24 .07 .25 
Region: Catalonia .27 .44 .26 .44 .38 .48 .34 .48 
Region: Andalusia .06 .24 .05 .22 .03 .18 .03 .17 
Firm in high tech sector .07 .26 .11 .31 .13 .34 .17 .38 
Firm in med-high sector .32 .47 .29 .45 41 .49 .40 .49 
Firm in med-low sector .28 .45 .28 .45 .22 .41 .22 .41 
 
Notes: All variables are binary except for Log of Relative Productivity, Share of highly educated 
employees, los of number of employees and age. Variables marked * refer to year 2005; otherwise 
they refer to the period 2003-2005. The share of highly educated employees refers to 2006, the first 
year this variable becomes available. The number of observations in each category corresponds to 
the number of observations effectively available in the sample used in the estimation of the 
baseline. It differs from previous tables because for some observations some variables have missing 
values. 
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LARGE Firms 
No support 
N=300 
 
Only subsidies 
N=143 
 
Only tax credits  
N=203 
 
Subsidies  
and tax credits 
N=160 
 
 Mean Sd Mean sd Mean Sd Mean sd 
Awareness of constraints .39 .25 .45 .25 .45 .21 .45 .21 
Financially constrained .25 .43 .28 .45 .24 .43 .26 .44 
Lack of personnel .07 .25 .10 .30 .05 .23 .07 .26 
Lack of information .06 .24 .12 .32 .10 .30 .11 .31 
Dominant firm .15 .36 .22 .41 .15 .36 .14 .35 
Demand risk .12 .32 .15 .36 .14 .35 .13 .34 
Appropriability_a .27 .45 .42 .50 .44 .50 .49 .50 
Log of Relative productivity* -.23 .75 -.10 .60 .02 .59 .01 .65 
Fixed Investment  .90 .30 .91 .29 .95 .23 .93 .25 
Low educated employees* .18 .38 .16 .37 .02 .14 .03 .17 
High educated employees .05 .22 .06 .23 .11 .31 .12 .32 
Take into account tax incentives .42 .49 .39 .49 .71 .45 .71 .45 
Group membership* .73 .44 .70 .46 .78 .42 .78 .41 
Private domestic firm* .66 .48 .65 .48 .64 .48 .76 .43 
Exporter* .80 .40 .85 .36 .87 .33 .91 .29 
Did in-house R&D*  .50 .50 .65 .48 .90 .30 .89 .31 
Log of number of employees* 5.97 .65 6.06 .65 6.09 .65 6.12 .78 
New firm* .003 .06 0 0 0 0 .01 .11 
Age* 31.8 23.1 34.1 21.7 35.2 22.9 35.9 22.9 
Located in technological park .01 .11 .03 .18 .01 .12 .03 17.4 
Region: Madrid .17 .38 .15 .36 .18 .38 .13 .34 
Region: Catalonia .29 .46 .27 .44 .37 .48 .31 .46 
Region: Andalusia .04 .20 .04 .20 .01 .12 .03 .16 
Firm in high tech sector .06 .23 .11 .32 .13 .34 .14 .35 
Firm in med-high sector .27 .44 .29 .45 .34 .47 .36 .48 
Firm in med-low sector .27 .45 .30 .46 .25 .43 .27 .44 
Notes: All variables are binary except for Log of Relative Productivity, Share of highly educated 
employees, los of number of employees and age. Variables marked * refer to year 2005; otherwise 
they refer to the period 2003-2005. The share of highly educated employees refers to 2006, the first 
year this variable becomes available. The number of observations in each category corresponds to 
the number of observations effectively available in the sample used in the estimation of the 
baseline. It differs from previous tables because for some observations some variables have missing 
values. 
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